Gallipoli
The Battle of
Gallipoli was one of the Allies great disasters in World War One. It was
carried out between 25th April 1915 and 9th January 1916 on the Gallipoli peninsula in the Ottoman Empire. The doomed campaign
was thought up by Winston Churchill to end the war early by creating a new war
front that the Ottomans could not cope with.
On 25th November 1914, Winston Churchill suggested his plan for a new war front in the
Dardanelles to the British government’s War Council. On January 15th 1915, the
War Council gave its agreement and British troops in Egypt were put on alert.
The Central Powers were fighting primarily on two fronts – the Western and
Eastern Fronts. Fighting against such he armies as the Russian and French
armies put a great deal of strain on the German military. The input of the
smaller Austrian army into the major battles had been small when compared to
the German army’s input.
Churchill’s idea
was simple. Creating another front would force the Germans to split their army
still further as they would need to support the badly rated Turkish army. When
the Germans went to assist the Turks, that would leave their lines weakened in
the west or east and lead to greater mobility there as the Allies would have a
weakened army to fight against.
The Turks had
joined the Central Powers in November 1914 and they were seen by Churchill as
being the weak underbelly of those who fought against the Allies.
Churchill had
contacted Admiral Carden– head of the British fleet anchored off of the
Dardanelles – for his thoughts on a naval assault on Turkish positions in the
Dardanelles. Carden was cautious about this and replied to Churchill that a
gradual attack might be more appropriate and had a greater chance of success.
Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, pushed Carden to produce a plan
which he, Churchill, could submit to the War Office. Senior commanders in the
navy were concerned at the speed with which Churchill seemed to be pushing an
attack on the Dardanelles. They believed that long term planning was necessary
and that Churchill’s desire for a speedy plan, and therefore, execution was
risky. However, such was Churchill’s enthusiasm, the War Council approved his
plan and targeted February as the month the campaign should start.
There is
confusion as to what was decided at this meeting of the War Council. Churchill
believed that he had been given the go-ahead; Asquith believed that what was
decided was merely“provisional to prepare, but nothing more.” A naval member of
the Council, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, stated:
“It was not my
business. I was not in any way connected with the question, and it had never in
any way officially been put before me." Churchill’s secretary considered
that the members of the Navy who were present “only agreed to a purely naval
operation on the understanding that we could always draw back – that there
should be no question of what is known as forcing the Dardanelles.”
With such apprehension
and seeming confusion as to what the War Office did believe, Churchill’s plan
was pushed through. It would appear that there was a belief that the Turks
would be an easy target and that minimal force would be needed for success.
Carden was given the go ahead to prepare an assault.
On
February 19th 1915, Carden opened up the attack on Turkish positions in the
Dardanelles. British and ANZAC troops were put on standby in Egypt.
The next phase
of the battle started in August. Hamilton ordered an attack on Suvla Bay that
was not heavily defended. The landing took place on August 6th and involved the
landing of 63,000 Allied troops. This time the secrecy behind the operation was
so complete that senior officers were unaware of what others were doing. These
63,000 men were meant to take the area around Suvla Bay and then link up with
the ANZAC’s at Anzac Cove. The plan very nearly worked but the ANZAC’s could
not break out of Anzac Cove. The British at Suvla were pushed back by a frantic
attack led by Mustapha Kemal and by August 10th, the Turks had retaken Suvla
Bay.
However, the
opponents of the campaign in London had become louder and more numerous.
Hamilton was recalled and he was replaced by Sir Charles Monro. He recommended
evacuation and the task was given to Birdwood. The evacuation of Suvla Bay and
Anzac Cove was a brilliant success. It was accomplished on December 19th to
December 20th. Not one casualty occurred.
The evacuation
of Helles occurred on January 8th to January 9th, again with no loss of life.
Thus the campaign ended with two successes.
However, the
overall campaign was a disaster of the first order. Over 200,000 Allied
casualties occurred with many deaths coming from disease. The number of Turkish
deaths is not clear but it is generally accepted that they were over 200,000.